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Private Remedies for Constitutional
Wrongs-A Matter of Perspective,
Priority, and Process
By DANIEL L. ROTENBERG*

Introduction
The focus of this Article is on the dualism of constitutional remedies. It proposes that courts should take a private remedy perspective
leading to a priority of private remedies over public remedies. This

would help ensure that those injured as a result of constitutional violations would receive as adequate a remedy as "due process" will allow.'
The analysis stresses two primary points. First, remedies designed
to vindicate public values, such as general deterrence of public officials or
restructuring of public institutions, should not supplant private remedies
but instead should act to supplement them.2 Similarly, public values
which serve to restrict or confine remedies should not affect the scope of
a private remedy.' Second, the private remedy should be as complete as
possible, either repairing or preventing the harm resulting from a constitutional violation.
This Article first discusses the current status of private remedies for
constitutional wrongs, focusing on the dual nature of constitutional
* Professor of Law, University of Houston. Many thanks to Catherine Welborn for
provocative ideas and solid research.
I. Suggesting a priority for private remedies does not mean that private remedies should
replace public ones. In any given case, once the private remedy is secure, it is a separate issue
whether a public remedy should also be given. In short, this Article is in favor of private
remedies, but it is not against public ones.
2. Any remedy may be either public or private. Its status depends upon its purpose and
its scope. Thus, the shorthand phrases "public remedy" and "private remedy" refer to the
reasons for and against the remedy and its role in regard to the nature of the remedy. The
shorthand phrases "public policies," "public values," and the like are meant to include negative as well as affirmative policies. The remedial phrase "victim specific" is avoided because it
suggests too narrow a perspective. No effort is made to define "public" or "private" remedy
because "definition" is a straight jacket. After analysis, a definition may be attempted, but not
before.
3. For example, if a plaintiff is in need of an injunction to secure relief from a state
violation, then doctrines such as abstention and comity, designed to foster respect for state
institutions, should not be applied to limit the appropriate relief.
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rights-public versus private, the traditional remedies afforded by the
courts for constitutional wrongs, and specific situations which suggest
the availability of both public and private remedies.4 The Article then
proposes an approach that would give private remedies priority in cases
in which an individual has been wronged as a result of a constitutional
violation. Finally, it discusses the proposal's advantages from both a
procedural and a practical perspective.

I.
A.

The Current Priority Status of Private Remedies

The Background

Constitutional rights are public benefits, established by society's basic charter of values and protected from interference by public officials. 5
They exist not as a gift from the sovereign to the individual, who thereafter possesses them as private rights, but as essential limitations on the
government for the benefit of all.
At the same time, however, constitutional rights are private rights.6
Only if a real injury is established are constitutional violations affecting
individual or private interests redressable in court.7 Abstract excesses in
violation of constitutional restraints are simply not correctable by
courts. 8

Some of the procedural limitations the United States Supreme Court
imposes on itself regarding its acceptance of cases on certiorari9 or its
4. See, e.g., infra notes 123-152 and accompanying text, discussing the exclusionary rule
and desegregation.
5. Most constitutional rights are not protected from infringement by private actors. The
Thirteenth Amendment is one clear exception, because its prohibition of slavery is geographic
and applies to any party whether public or private.
6. For historical support, see infra note 34 and accompanying text. An illustrative case
of the private right perspective is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
7. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the
Supreme Court took a relaxed view of Article III standing requirements. However, recently
the Court has been more demanding, requiring actual or threatened injury-in-fact plus causation as irreducible minimum constitutional requirements. For two conflicting views of the
standing issue, see the opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan in Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
8. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (Internal
Revenue ruling allowing hospitals to deny indigents service was held not subject to challenge
by indigents because the connection between the ruling and essential injury-in- fact was too
speculative).
9. All of the "[c]onsiderations governing review on certiorari" specified in Rule 17 of the
Supreme Court Rules concern public values, e.g., conflicts among courts or importance of
federal law. Stating this differently, nothing in Rule 17 is directed at private or individual
concerns. See Sup. CT. R. 17.
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limited scope of review on appeal,"0 reflect the Court's emphasis on the
nature of constitutional litigation. The same is true for the limitations it
imposes on itself and other federal courts through doctrines such as political questions,' 1 comity, 2 and abstention. 3 On the other hand, procedural doctrines such as standing, 4 ripeness, 15 and mootness' 6 indicate
7
the Court's concern with the private character of a controversy.'
The private/public dualism has presented a dilemma for both the
Supreme Court and other courts in deciding whether private rights are
implicated in a given violation, and whether a particular remedy is appropriate. One question that arises concerns the litigant's role in distin10. Guidance by the Supreme Court concerning potentially relevant considerations is not
very helpful, requesting only "[a] statement of the reasons why the questions presented are so
substantial as to require plenary consideration .... " Sup. Cr. R. 15.1(h).
11. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217, this limitation was narrowly confined. Prior to
Baker, the political question doctrine was the foremost Court-created means used by the
Supreme Court for keeping federal courts out of sensitive public issues. Baker reviewed the
earlier cases, consolidated them, and then condensed them into six categories-all related to
"separation of power" issues. Arguably only two of the categories, prior discretion in another
agency, and textual commitment to another decisionmaker, have any significant meaning and
thus confining impact on the lower federal courts.
12. Comity reflects the respect the federal judiciary has for its judicial cousins in state
courts. This public policy is implemented in decisions rejecting interference by federal courts
in ongoing state procedures, and in injunctions against state officials. Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971), supports both propositions. Comity has also been extended in several cases.
See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
13. Abstention is based upon several factors: (1) the avoidance of unnecessarily deciding
constitutional issues; (2) the avoidance of an injunction applied to state officials; and (3) the
avoidance of useless litigation. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
14. Even where a constitutional violation is clear and intentional, and even where public
values unanimously favor litigation, without injury-in-fact to the complainant there is no constitutional standing. See supra note 7.
15. When courts decide that an issue is not ripe, it means that either an injury-in-fact has
not yet occurred or that the threat of it occurring is not yet real. Ripeness is an inherent
problem in cases in which an injunction or declaratory judgment is sought, because both are
anticipatory remedies. Significantly, ripeness determinations are often based on public factors,
thus reflecting a public and not a private perspective. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961). In Poe, it is unclear whether the ripeness question is constitutionally or policy based,
16. Mootness suggests that a dispute has become overripe and therefore is no longer real.
However, as with ripeness, to some extent it may not be a constitutional doctrine. See supra
note 15.
17. Although standing, ripeness, and mootness all have constitutional roots, the Court has
a great deal of discretion in invoking them. Furthermore, the determinations are often policy
based. See, eg., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). In this case, Justice Frankfurter for the
plurality, and Justice Harlan in dissent, disagreed on how the policy of ripeness should be
applied to the particular facts. It should also be noted that the private factors of limitation can
be overcome by exceptions. However, the exceptions are not well defined and often appear to
be result oriented. For example, because intangible interests of almost unlimited variety qualify under the injury-in-fact test, the Court has a great deal of discretion in deciding standing
issues. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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guishing between public and private remedies. It often appears that the
remedy's characterization depends upon the pleadings. Requests for
damages, for example, indicate a private remedy whereas an injunction
or declaratory judgment could be classified as either public or private.' 8
A class action suit suggests a public remedy, whereas a single plaintiff
often prefers customized relief. A pattern and practice allegation also
suggests a public remedy. 9 To a great degree, then, the plaintiff may
control the remedy.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes,2 ° the Supreme Court addressed a related question of whether a damage claim brought against a government employee
was of a private or public nature. The Court concluded that the pleadings controlled, thus leaving the choice to the plaintiff.
Specificity by a plaintiff has both advantages and drawbacks. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,2 1 for example, the plaintiff's strategy was to seek a limited private remedy and avoid a class
action suit.2 2 The strategy proved successful in that it allowed four of the
Justices finding in Bakke's favor to decide the case narrowly.2 3 However,
in De Funis v. Odegaard,2 4 the strategy to sue only on behalf of the plaintiff backfired. The Court was able to dodge the merits of the claim by
not have
interposing the mootness doctrine-a procedure that would
25
been available had the plaintiff brought a class action suit.
A plaintiff may be hesitant to be specific in pleading because the
identity and scope of the constitutional wrong, the procedural require18. When an injunction or a declaratory judgment is sought against an unconstitutional
governmental practice, it may take on both public and private dimensions. A plaintiff may
seek specific redress and general relief simultaneously.
19. When an individual complains that an unconstitutional governmental practice is being
applied to him repeatedly, this can be viewed as a pattern and practice situation. Usually,
however, the pattern and practice challenged is directed to a wider audience. In Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), a pattern and practice challenge to Philadelphia police official
policies failed because it was viewed by the Court as too public-too much oriented toward
future police practices in the abstract and not enough oriented toward actual injuries to the

plaintiffs.
20. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).

21. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
22. See J. DREYFUSS & C.

LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE 37, 1k)5-96 (1979).
23. Justice Stevens, writing for himself, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist, interpreted Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to prohibit e\clusion of any person from a federally funded program because of race. For them, any broader question was out
of order. 438 U.S. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
24. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
25. The result in DeFunis was not predictable during the early stages of its planning.
Moreover, the Court's finding of mootness did little to settle the issue. Sce DeFunis,416 U.S.
at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting). However, a few years later, the Court attempted to clarify the
mootness question. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103 (1975); United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 307-401 (1980).
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ments, and the range of available remedies are often dependent on this
step. However, approaching a case in its several alternatives has its own
perils. A plaintiff, through nonspecificity, relinquishes both control and
particularity to the court. In such instances, the court will determine on
its own the public or private nature of the remedy. Thus, the dualism
underlying constitutional remedies must be considered throughout all
stages of constitutional litigation.2 6
The Constitution is neither careful nor consistent in its creation of
rights.2 7 Although the text of the Bill of Rights allows selected rights to
be classified as private, it does not support a conclusion that all or the
majority of rights stated there are private. On the contrary, the casual
and inconsistent phrasing, the repeated use of the term "people," 2 and
the failure to designate a private right holder in the context of speech,29
religion, 0 excessive bail,3 1 and cruel and unusual punishment3 2 suggests
a public perspective for the litigation of these rights. Further, when dealing with remedies the Constitution is less supportive of private interests.
With the exception of the "just compensation" mandate for eminent do26. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), the plaintiffs included a very wide assortment
of injured persons and groups, but the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court found that
no one had standing. No matter how carefully a plaintiff structures and steers his case toward
a private remedy, the courts may ultimately characterize it as public.
27. Within the Bill of Rights, the language used to identify the right holder varies from
clause to clause, and includes "accused," "person," "people," and "owner." For instance, the
Sixth Amendment reads "the accused shall enjoy the right. .. " and all following rights are
related to the "accused." "Person" is the key word in the Fifth Amendment. It is used twice
and all rights are connected to this term. "People" is the only word used in more than one of
the Amendments-the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments. The First, Second, and Fourth Amendments refer to the "right of the people." The Ninth Amendment
speaks of "rights.., retained by the people." The Tenth Amendment reserves certain "powers
... to the people." In addition, "We the People. . ." begins the preamble to the Constitution.
Finally, "Owner" appears in the Third Amendment.
28. The word "people" is ambiguous. By the term, the Framers could have intended it to
mean: (I) like the word "persons," a plural of person; (2) persons of a selected kind, e.g.,
citizens; or (3) the public persons as in the notion "the people are sovereign," or "We the
people." The Oxford English Dictionary establishes that in 1787, the word "people" already
had so many meanings that no definitive single meaning can be identified. It is interesting to
note that the Fourth Amendment could have easily substituted the phrase "every person" for
"the people." This would have achieved consistency with the language of the Fifth Amendment except that the first part of the Fourth would still have been phrased affirmatively and
the Fifth negatively.
29. Although the First Amendment refers to "people," the reference is limited to the
"right... to assemble .... " When the Amendment speaks of speech, religion, and press it is
phrased as a prohibition and one against Congress only.
30. Id.
31. The Eighth Amendment simply provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required ......
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32. After prohibiting excessive bail, the Eighth Amendment then states, "nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
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main, the document is almost silent.3 3
Based on common-law principles, it is likely that the Drafters presumed that constitutional rights and remedies were, for the most part,
private.34 Thus, the Drafters perceived no need to distinguish between
public and private rights and remedies. The Supreme Court, as the referee for constitutional disputes, has made it clear that although public
parameters are a relevant concern in private litigation under the Constitution, the bottom line is that constitutional rights and wrongs are
private.
33. The Fifth Amendment states, "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." Other remedy references include the prohibition against the suspension of habeas corpus. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
34. Although natural law, with its emphasis on individual rights, was losing its preeminence, in the late eighteenth century it was still the prevailing legal thought in the United
States. Furthermore, Blackstone's theories were highly influential in the United States in 1787.
According to Blackstone, individuals were endowed with three great rights: life, liberty, and
property. These three rights were augmented by five "auxiliary subordinate rights" promulgated to protect the basic ones. Central importance was given to the right of every Englishman
to apply to the courts for redress of injuries. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 70, 74-76 (Gavit
ed. 1941). The four other rights which were to serve as barriers to protect the basic rights
were: (1) the right of the Constitution (Parliament); (2) the right of limitations on the King's
prerogative; (3) the right of petition for redress; and (4) the right of bearing arms. Id.
By 1787, the case for private rights in the United States was much stronger. By then the
people were recognized as sovereign. Constitutional rights were thus not public rights of the
people against themselves; rather, they were private rights of individuals against the people
acting through their agents, governmental officials. "[P]ublic or political liberty ... lost its
significance ....
The liberty.., now emphasized was personal or private .... " G. WooD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 609 (1969).
It is worth observing that even with right and remedy considered private, the Supreme
Court had trouble from the beginning enforcing the private remedy on behalf of an individual
against public institutions. In the famous case of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832), the Court found the State of Georgia's conviction (and sentence of 4 years confinement) of Samuel Worcester to be unconstitutional. Felix Cohen reports what proceeded:
It was of the decision in Worcester v. Georgia that President Jackson is reported to
have said, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it." As a
matter of history, the State of Georgia, unsuccessful defendant in the case, never did
carry out the Supreme Court's decision, and the "successful" plaintiff, a guest of the
Cherokee Nation, continued to languish in a Georgia prison, under a Georgia law
which, according to the Supreme Court decision, was unconstitutional.
F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 123 (1942).

Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), is an even earlier example of
the Court's trouble enforcing private remedies against public agencies. In that case, enforcement was against a state court.
35. In most cases in which a plaintiff loses because of a public policy, the Supreme Court's
point is not that the right or remedy is public only, but rather that the public policy has not
been satisfied in the instance. The plaintiff is in effect told that he is the wrong person to
complain, or he is too premature (or too late), or in the wrong court, or the remedy he has
selected is too broad, misdirected, or irrelevant. Occasionally, however, a claimed constitutional right may vanish under a rubric such as "political question," where the right and the
issue it creates are held to be nonjusticiable. What looked like a private right is not one.
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From Marbury v. Madison36 to Bush v. Lucas,3 7 the Supreme Court
has supported the general rule that for every legal wrong there is a legal
remedy. Although this notion has survived long enough to have developed a specific framework, it still retains its original vagueness. It does
not indicate whether the remedy for the person whose constitutional
right has been violated is to be exclusively private, exclusively public, or
a mix. Nor does it clarify what elements go into determining the scope of
an appropriate legal38 remedy. Analysis would be simplified if the notion
of constitutional remedy were more closely related to the idea of consti39
tutional wrong so that the remedial result were more or less automatic.
In Davis v. Passman,4 an individual sought damages for an alleged
due process violation under the Fifth Amendment.4 1 Justice Brennan,
writing for five members of the Court, made an effort to distinguish between "right," "cause of action," "standing," and "relief." The opinion
demonstrated that all four concepts are rooted in the same claim of injury for which the plaintiff was seeking redress.4 2 It is thus natural to
define one concept by reference to another. For example, in the 1974
43
companion cases of Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War
and United States v. Richardson,' Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
Court, observed that a lack of standing indicated, in most cases, an absence of a right.4 5 It has also been argued that the lack of a remedy may
indicate the lack of a right.4 6 At other times, however, the Davis analysis
has prevailed, thus attaching to each concept a separate meaning.
Consequently, in a situation in which the plaintiff asserts third party
rights, the inquiry into constitutional standing relates to injury of the
36. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162-63 (1803).
37. 462 U.S. 367, 373 (1983).
38. "Legal" as used in the phrase "legal remedy" is not meant to exclude equitable remedies. Rather the word is used to tie "legal right" to judicial remedies.
39. Simplification, however, would not necessarily improve the situation. An "automatic
remedy" might lead to an inflexible, stultified approach. See infra notes 179, 185 and accompanying text.
40. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
41. The plaintiff sought damages for alleged sex discrimination by Representative Passman when he discharged her from her job as an administrative aide.
42. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 240 n.18; see generally id. at 236-49.
43. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
44. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
45. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 177-78; Schlesinger,418 U.S. at 225-26. The same point was
reaffirmed in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, 454 U.S. 464, 489 (1982). In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), a
divided Court made a connection between standing and remedy. See infra notes 167-175 and
accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
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litigant;4 7 the constitutional right violated, however, belongs to a third
person.4 8 Suppose, to carry this illustration a bit further, the third party
requires only prospective relief-a declaration that the law is unconstitutional or an injunction to prevent future administration-but the plaintiff needs, in addition, compensation for past injury. Should only an
injunction be granted, or should damages be granted as well? In other
words, is injury-in-fact not only essential to standing but automatically a
factor in determining the remedy; is injury-in-fact merely an essential
procedural trigger and not relevant to the remedy determination; or is
the scope of the remedy to be determined by policy considerations relevant to it, but which may or may not include the injury-in-fact?
The answers to these questions are not yet settled. If the plaintiff
wins on the merits, due to a violation of a third party's constitutional
right, perhaps the plaintiff's recovered remedy should not be greater than
the third party's relief. On the other hand, the plaintiff, although relying
upon a third party's right to win his own case, ought to be entitled to a
49
remedy that satisfies his needs.
This uncertainty suggests that right, standing, and cause of action,
although serving as prerequisites to reaching the remedy issue, are not
necessarily dispositive or even relevant to resolving remedial problems.
This state of affairs reflects the law's continuing ambivalence toward constitutional litigation. Rights have a tendency to expand from private to
public-to be seen as belonging to all. Procedures, on the other hand,
retain their close allegiance to the private perspective. And remedies?
They float free-as though the law did not know what to do with them.
B. Private Remedies on a Leash
1.

TraditionalRelief

Although it is fairly easy to plead a remedy in federal court, it is
more difficult to get it." This difficulty is due to the Court's maintenance
of uncertain standards for obtaining each type of relief. Leaving aside
both the immunity defenses5" and the role of Congress in creating reme47. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
48. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
49. Similarly, the exclusionary rule in criminal cases has a split personality. The current
rationale supporting it is the public deterrence of police illegality; yet standing to complain is
reserved to those with a private injury. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
50. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3) calls for the claim for relief to include "a
demand for judgment for the relief to which [t]he [claimant] deems himself entitled." FED. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(3). For a discussion of what this means, see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2662 (1983).
51. See infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
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dies,52 the Court has historically preferred the injunction to either damages or declaratory relief. 3 The Court has approved the use of damages
so infrequently, that Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Carlson v.
Green,5" noted that "[n]o ... authority of federal courts to award damages for violations of constitutional rights had ever been recognized prior
to Bivens." 5
a. Injunction
The preferred status of the injunction has diminished in recent years
because the Court has insisted that "irreparable injury" must be shown
before an injunction could be issued. 6 In 1983, in City of Los Angeles v.

Lyons,5 7 the Court further curtailed the availability of injunctive relief.
The Court denied an injunction because standing, for purposes of obtaining an injunction, could not be shown. 8 Moreover, the Court appeared to 59 increase the height of the "irreparable injury"60 hurdle by
adding a requirement of "great and immediate" harm to the standard
52. See infra notes 86-122 and accompanying text.
53. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), in which the Court affirmed a federal injunction against a state attorney general. The Court, in discussing the propriety of the equitable injunction, aside from the eleventh amendment issue, found it preferable to either a state
criminal action or civil penalty suit as a means of challenging the constitutionality of the state
law. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 42-43 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court provided for federal district courts to use their equitable powers to remedy school segregation.
Thus, Svann indicates that where the government has committed complex constitutional violations, only equitable remedies, including injunctions, are flexible enough to provide sufficient
relief to those injured by the activity.
54. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
55. Id. at 43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
56. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965). In Dombrowski, Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, traced the federal injunction back to the "fountainhead" case
of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). He then discussed the gradual decline in its use.
Prior to Dombrowski, "irreparable injury" was not a serious requirement, at least concerning
injunctions against threatened prosecution. See Laycock, FederalInterference with State Prosecutions: The Cases Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHi. L. REV. 636 (1979).
57. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
58. Prior to Lyons, the Court had never determined standing by reference to the specific
remedy. Standing, regardless of remedy, had been tied to the wrong.
59. "Appeared to" is a needed qualification for two reasons: (1) the part of the opinion
containing the term "great and immediate" may be considered only dicta since the Court had
earlier in the opinion concluded that the plaintiff had no standing; and (2) the context of the
phrase is ambiguous enough to allow the Court in the future to disclaim that it was trying to
change simple injunction requirements. See 461 U.S. at 112.
60. The Court failed to clarify the meaning of "irreparable injury" in Lyons. In fact, it
avoided the question entirely. Thus, the meaning of the phrase in the constitutional litigation
context remains unclear. Arguably. because constitutional rights are very important and yet of
very uncertain value, each of them when violated presents an "irreparable injury." See D.
Domis, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF RI-MEmIis 7.4 (1973).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 14:77

injunction requirements.6 1
b.

Damages

The Court has also moved slowly in clarifying the extent of damage
remedies. In Carey v. Piphus,62 two students brought an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against officials at their schools. The students asserted that
they were suspended from school without procedural due process. The
district court found that the students had been denied due process, but
declined to award damages because the extent of their actual injury was
too difficult to ascertain. The court of appeals reversed and remanded,
noting that even if the plaintiffs could not show actual individualized
injury, they would be entitled to recover substantial "nonpunitive" damages based upon the denial of due process.6 3
The Supreme Court in a startling opinion reversed the court of appeals. The Court held that regardless of whether or not the suspensions
were justified, the plaintiff was entitled to a damage award for the constitutional violation. However, if it was determined that the suspensions
were justified, the plaintiffs should recover "nominal damages not to exceed one dollar .... 64

Carey, however, left unanswered the question of how to measure the
harm incurred by a constitutional wrong. 65 This problem is compounded
by the dichotomy in distinguishing between procedural and substantive
rights, the variety of protected rights, and by the Supreme Court's classification of certain constitutional rights as fundamental."
In Memphis Community School District v. Stachura,6 7 the Court
confronted the issue of measuring constitutional wrongs. The majority
flatly rejected the notion that damages could be based on the abstract
61. 461 U.S. at 112. The "great and immediate" language comes from the Court's comity
cases that preclude federal courts from enjoining certain on-going state judicial proceedings.

62. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
63. Id. at 252.
64. Id. at 268.
65. The Court in Carey addressed the issue of measuring damages. As an "appropriate
starting point," the Court applied principles derived from the common law of torts. However,
the Court was careful to note that in many instances, the application of tort damage principles
to damages for constitutional violations were insufficient. Id. at 257-58. For example, the
Court refused to equate procedural due process wrongs with defamation wrongs, and thus
allow damages without proof of injury. The Court also acknowledged that the compensation
rules can vary depending on the constitutional right infringed. Id. at 259, 264-65. Further, the
Court recognized but refused to approve lower court decisions which based damages on a
presumption of injury without actual proof in instances in which the rights violated included
racial equality, voting, and fourth amendment privacy. Id. at 264.
66. The Court in Carey recognized but did not solve these problems.
67. 106 S. Ct. 2537 (1986).
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value of a constitutional right. However, Justice Marshall's concurring
opinion, joined by three other Justices, emphasized that the majority was
not ruling out damages based solely upon a constitutional wrong. Instead, damages will only be recoverable when tied to a wrong actually
suffered.6" Another way of viewing the distinction is to say that private,
but not public constitutional wrongs may be compensable.69 To put it
still differently and more in keeping with the approach taken in this Article, damages are available as a private remedy but not as a public one.
The significance of both Carey and Stachurais not that the right violated
is any less private but that the remedy should be customized so as to fit
the wrong. Unfortunately, the Court views a constitutional wrong as if it
were just another tort wrong. Instead of evaluating a wrong at zero
because abstract, or at maximum one dollar, the Court could as easily
conclude that a constitutional wrong--every constitutional wrong-is a
substantial or significant or meaningful injury to the person affected.
One factor that could provide specificity to the formula for damages
would be the idea that the costs of litigation should be compensable.
These could include not only the usual trial and attorney expenses but
the costs associated with time, inconvenience, and mental stress of the
plaintiff in carrying the burden of repairing a constitutional violation.

After all, if only persons injured in fact can bring law suits to keep the
governments within constitutional boundaries, some reason for the plain-

tiff to sue must exist.
c.

Declaratory Relief
Constitutional litigants often seek relief in the form of a declaratory

68. If no compensable injury to a constitutional right is established, then damages are
limited to traditional factors including "emotional distress, humiliation and personal indignity,
emotional pain, embarrassment, fear, anxiety and anguish." Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1,62
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2547 (1985). The concurring opinion in Stachura
expressly approves Hobson. 106 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (Marshall, J., concurring). The majority
opinion cites Hobson twice in an approving manner but without an express commitment. 106
S. Ct. at 2541 n.5, 2544 n.13.
69. It remains unclear to what extent or in what situations, if any, the remedial law of the
state in which the federal court is sitting should be relevant or determinative. The Court in
Carey quoted language authorizing federal courts to look to the common law of the states
where "necessary to furnish suitable remedies." Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 258 n.13 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 1988). The Court, however, did not use this section in its analysis. Furthermore,
the footnote reference is inaccurate to the extent it suggests that the common law of the states
act as a national norm to be consulted. The statute ties the common law to the state in which
the federal court is sitting and limits it by stating that the applicable law is to be the "common
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court
having jurisdiction of such civil ... cause is held .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
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judgment.7" Because it is a statutory remedy,7 1 it is theoretically free

from the "at law" or "in equity" restrictions that delimit damages and
injunctions. 72 Recently, however, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, has hinted that "equitable considerations" may be vital in determining the propriety of a declaratory judgment.7"

Even though its sui generis status, if it remains, would seem to give
declaratory relief a favorable position among judicial remedies, the Court
in Steffel v. Thompson 74 turned it into a "now you see it, now you don't"
remedy. The declaratory judgment denied by the lower court in Steffel
was reversed by the Supreme Court but given nonbinding effect. 75 Presumably this result was acceptable to Justice Brennan on the one hand,
because he assumed that the states would routinely abide by such judg70. Although not a traditional remedy in the sense of lengthy historical use, declaratory
relief can be traced back to the Middle Ages and then forward through the Scottish practice of
"declarator" beginning around 1540. However, it is primarily a twentieth century device in
the United States. The first seemingly effective statute in the United States was passed in 1915
in New Jersey. See E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 23745 (1934).
71. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1982).
72. Lower federal courts differ regarding the classification of declaratory judgments. As
one court phrased it: "A declaratory judgment action cannot be termed as either inherently at
law or in equity." Wallace v. Norman Indus., 467 F.2d 824, 827 (5th Cir. 1972). Probably
most courts view declaratory judgment as "partially equitable," or "in the nature of equity,"
or "based on equity." Even disregarding its statutory base "[ilt
is not, however, either strictly
equitable or legal relief, and whatever its historical affinity with equity, the proceeding is special and sui generis, disregarding the distinctions between law and equity and the technical
limitations of both." E. BORCHARD, supra note 70, at 172.
73. Green v. Mansour, 106 S.Ct. 423, 428 (1985).
74. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
75. Justice Brennan writing for a "unanimous" Court and quoting his separate opinion in
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125 (1971), stated that "the federal court judgment may have
some resjudicataeffect, though this point is not free from difficulty and the governing rules
remain to be developed ...." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at 470. Intriguingly, Justice
Brennan in quoting himself omitted the only footnote in Perez which accompanied the quote.
In the Perez footnote, he quoted the Senate Report on the federal declaratory judgment law:
"The declaratory judgment is a final, binding judgment between adversary parties and conclusively determines their rights." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 125 n.16 (quoting S. REP No.
1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934)).
Although the opinion in Steffel appears to be unanimous (the only question is whether
Justice White is "concurring" in the opinion as well as in the judgment), it is clearly not
unanimous on the res judicata point. Three views are alive: (1) the majority's ambiguous
position; (2) Justice White's view that "[a]t this writing at least . . ." the judgment is res
judicata (Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at 477(White, J., concurring)); and (3) Justice Rehnquist's view that a federal declaratory judgment may be raised later in a state court "for
whatever value it may prove to have." (Id. at 482 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). Although
Justice Rehnquist claims in a footnote to be expressing "no opinion" on the resjudicata point,
his position hardly qualifies as "no opinion." Id. at 482 n.3.
Justice White expressly notes that Professor Borchard anticipated that the declaratory
judgment would be res judicata. Id. at 477 (White, J., concurring).

Fall 1986]

PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL WRONGS

89

ments, and to Justice Rehnquist on the other hand, because he assumed
that the states would freely ignore them.
The significance of the current status of declaratory relief is that the
Court not only has interpreted the federal declaratory judgment statute
to provide the judiciary with discretion rather than providing the litigant
with a right,
but also has been reluctant to let the federal courts use this
76
discretion.
Because of the Supreme Court's failure to define and delineate the
rules of traditional remedies, the constitutional litigant seeking such relief faces a confusing and formidable situation. The common sense expectation that upon reaching the remedy stage in litigation, an appropriate
remedy would automatically follow is not the law.
2. Immunities

A complainant injured as a result of a constitutional violation who
seeks damages or monetary compensation 77 confronts a major hurdle in
the form of immunity defenses. These defenses are available to both governments and their employees. Government employees, especially those
in an executive or administrative capacity, only have a conditional immunity.7" Although the Constitution for the most part is silent regarding
immunities,7 9 the Court has repeatedly endorsed the common-law immunity defenses.8"
76. See Green v. Mansour, 106 S. Ct. at 428-29.
77. In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974), the monetary compensation was
characterized as "equitable restitution." The Court treated it the same as damages. A distinction is drawn, however, between money for accrued wrongs and money for "prospective-compliance." Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977).
78. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
79. Article I of the United States Constitution protects members of Congress by providing
that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [the senators and representatives] shall not be
questioned in any other Place." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111, 123-33 (1979), in which Chief Justice Burger summarizes the cases brought
under that clause.
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 755-57 (1982), the Court read into the Constitution
an absolute immunity from damages liability for the President acting within the "outer perimeter" of his office.
80. The Court has recently restated its position that immunities for legislative, judicial,
and executive officers-at least in § 1983 cases-are "predicated upon a considered inquiry
into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests
behind it." Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 421 (1976)). Sovereign immunity for the states, aside from the Eleventh Amendment. is
also common-law based. Further, it has not fully protected the states from liability. In
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), the state was held subject to suit in federal
court. In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), the state was held subject to suit in another
state's court. Furthermore, Article III of the United States Constitution authorizes suits in
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Of course, the "sovereign" may always elect to waive its immunity;
however, a waiver of sovereign immunity will rarely be implied.8' More
importantly, the fact that the plaintiff loses his case because of the immunity defense does not make the action by the government or its employee
constitutional.
The Eleventh Amendment must also be considered along with the
immunity defenses.82 Although conceived as a limitation on the power
of federal courts, it has been construed by the Supreme Court to function
as a limitation on sovereign immunity. 3 To what extent the common-

law sovereign immunity and the eleventh amendment sovereign immunity have merged is questionable. 84 However, the Court's policies of immunity have the effect, if not the purpose, of undercutting any priority
federal court against states by other states and by the United States. What remains, aside from
the Eleventh Amendment, is an immunity from suit in the state's own courts.
As for federal sovereign immunity, the Court announced the defense in United States v.
McLemore, 45 U.S. 286 (1846), saying that "the government is not liable to be sued, except
with its own consent, given by law." Id. at 288. Presumably this rule is based on the common
law, because the Court takes its validity for granted. Nowhere in McLemore or other early
cases supporting the rule is there a discussion of its source or scope.
81. Waiver of sovereign immunity "cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed." United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) (federal government). This phrase was
quoted again in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978) (Indian Tribe). As
for waiver of a state's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment the Court has said: "[W]e
will find waiver only where stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming
implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.'"
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213
U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
82. The Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
U.S. CONST. amend. 11.
83. In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984), the
Court noted that "the [Eleventh] Amendment's language overruled the particular result in
Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater significance lies in its affirmation that
the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art.
IIl."
84. In the Special Master's Memorandum and Report on Preliminary Issues in Arizona v.
California (dated August 28, 1979), the issue of intervention by Indian tribes was decided in
favor of the tribes over sovereign immunity objections by the state parties. Footnote 29 of the
memorandum is relevant:
There is some uncertainty whether the States' immunity beyond the terms of the
Eleventh Amendment is incorporated constitutionally into the amendment or rests
solely on judicially protected sovereign immunity. Compare Employees v. Department of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 n.1 (1973), and id. at 290-94
(Marshall, J., concurring) with id. at 309-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally
C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMEN'r AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972).
The question does not affect this decision and the terms "Eleventh Amendment,"
"Eleventh Amendment immunity," and "sovereign immunity" are used interchangeably to refer to the concepts those terms embody.

Fall 1986]

PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL WRONGS

91

85
that a private remedy of damages may have.

3.

The Role of Congress

86
Although Congress has a degree of authority over federal courts,
nothing in the Constitution authorizes Congress, once it grants authority
to the courts, to regulate remedies essential to correct a constitutional
wrong.87 However, Congress, in authorizing actions in federal court for
constitutional violations, often includes statutory remedial provisions. 8
In numerous cases, the Supreme Court has considered the legal significance of these statutory remedies.8 9 The issue, however, is generally not
framed as a remedy question; instead, the Court focuses on whether a
claim may be brought for a constitutional violation absent any statute
Id. at 17-18 n.29.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Special Master's position on intervention and stated
in a footnote: "There are suggestions in the papers that the states' sovereign immunity is in
some respect distinct from the immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment. Insofar as the
question of intervention posed here is concerned, we appreciate no such difference." Arizona
v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614 n.4 (1983).
85. If both government and employee are protected from liability by immunity, the remedy of damages is illusory except to the degree that the immunity does not apply.
86. The Constitution expressly provides that Congress has the authority to create--or not
create-federal courts. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. Congress also has explicit authority in Article III to regulate and make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Id. at

§ 2.
87. Although from the power that Congress has to create lower federal courts one might
assume that Congress may also regulate the jurisdictional and remedial scope of these courts,
this result is not self-evident. The language of Article III states that "[t]he judicial Power of
the United States shall be vested... in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish." One implication that could be drawn from this language is that
although no lower federal courts need be established, if they are, then the judicial power of the
United States vests-in short, the Constitution and not Congress is the source of the power.
As one commentator has observed, however, "I am aware of no one who argues that article III
jurisdiction automatically extends to lower federal courts upon their creation." Sager,
Foreward:ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress'Authority to Regulate the Jurisdictionof the
FederalCourts, 95 HARv. L. REV. 17, 25 n.22 (1981).
88. For example, the civil rights statutes passed following the Civil War illustrate a variety of approaches taken by Congress. While 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1982 (1982) contain no
remedies at all, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) contains an open ended approach, authorizing "an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(1982) allows only damages. The modern approach by Congress is to provide a greater variety
of remedies, including governmental involvement in administrative monitoring of the statute
and in initiating enforcement litigation in the courts. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 is an
example. The Court upheld many of the Act's remedial provisions in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
89. The issue is not whether the courts are free on constitutional or policy grounds to
refuse to use a remedy authorized by Congress. Rather, it is whether the courts are bound by
limited remedies sometimes specified by Congress in statutes authorizing suit for a constitutional violation.
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authorizing a cause of action. 90
While Congress may fail to include a constitutional right in its array
of federal statutory protections, the omission does not preclude federal
court jurisdiction. Several Supreme Court cases support the conclusion
that given the validity of both jurisdiction and remedy, the substantive
right may be based solely upon the Constitution. 9
The primary issue facing the Court regarding the role of the legislature is whether damages can be given by a federal court when jurisdiction
and a rights violation are found, but where Congress has been silent or
ambiguous as to the remedy. 92 In Bivens v. Six Unknown FederalNarcotics Agents,9 3 the Court allowed a federal action for damages on the alleged facts that agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics had engaged
in an illegal search and seizure resulting in "great humiliation, embarrassment, and mental suffering... ,"4Although no federal law covered
the matter, the Court was not deterred. Instead, the Court took a step by
step approach. First, it identified the Constitution as the sole source of
the right;9" second, it emphasized the individual's "personal" or private
90. Congressional failure to authorize a cause of action generally takes two forms. First,
Congress may fail to provide a jurisdictional statute. The most obvious example of this is
Congress' failure to authorize federal courts to hear federal questions prior to 1875. Second, it
may fail to make the alleged constitutional violation a substantive wrong. See, e.g., Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Procedurally,
so long as some forum remains open and available, Congress may completely deny the federal
trial forum to constitutional litigants. For example, the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942, creating the emergency price control scheme during World War II, closed all federal and
state courts to actions challenging the law's validity, funneling them instead to a specialized
court. Thus, Congress, in effect, removed from the federal courts the power to rule on the
constitutionality of the legislation. The Supreme Court upheld this action in a series of cases.
See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944);
Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
91. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (Eighth Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228 (1979) (Fifth Amendment); Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971) (Fourth Amendment). For a discussion of Bivens and the use of constitutionally
based rights as a "sword," see Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a
Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972).
92. The federal courts' power to grant relief not expressly authorized by Congress is
firmly established. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), the federal courts have jurisdiction to decide all cases "aris[ing] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." This jurisdictional grant provides not only the authority to decide
whether a cause of action is stated by a plaintiff's claim that he has been injured by a
violation of the Constitution, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946), but also the
authority to choose among available judicial remedies in order to vindicate constitutional rights.
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 374 (1983).
93. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
94. Id. at 389-90.
95. Id. at 392-94.
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injury rather than the public wrong; 9 6 and third, it empowered the federal courts to use any available remedy to repair the wrong committed. 97
The question of congressional silence concerning remedy was not
ignored by the Court in Bivens. Justice Brennan noted that "we have
here no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money
damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another rem'
edy, equally effective in the view of Congress. "98
In Davis v. Passman,99 decided eight years after Bivens, Justice Brennan again wrote for the Court majority in a five to four decision. He in
essence repeated his three propositions from Bivens: (1) that the Fifth
Amendment by itself is a sufficient basis for finding a right; 1" (2) that the
equality demand of the Fifth Amendment is a "personal" right and not
simply a standard for gauging the performance of public officials;1 °1 and
(3) that damages are an appropriate "remedial mechanism normally
02
available in the federal courts."'
Less than a year after Davis, the Court in Carlson v. Green1 13 further
clarified its view of the role of Congress. Unlike Bivens and Davis, Carlson concerned an injury that was arguably compensable under a recent
amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"); 1°4 thus, the
Court was not dealing with congressional silence. The plaintiff, however,
ignoring the statute, sought damages directly under the Eighth
05
Amendment.1
Justice Brennan, in writing again for five members of the Court, did
not posit that the FTCA was the appropriate law for the plaintiff to invoke, thereby removing the burden on the plaintiff to justify his failure to
rely upon it. Instead, he noted that the right to sue under the Constitution must be given priority. The opinion further stressed that Congress
did not intend for the FTCA to be a "substitute" remedy, 106 and that
several factors present suggested that the Bivens remedy was more effec96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 394-95.
Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. at 684).
Id. at 397.
442 U.S. 228 (1979).
Id. at 244.

101. Id. at 235 n.10. At footnote 10, the Court added: "This right is personal; it is peti-

tioner, after all, who must suffer the effects of such discrimination." Id.
102. Id. at 248 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397).
103. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1974).
105. Instead of suing the government under the FTCA, the plaintiff sued the public officials
under the Constitution. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 16.
106. Id. at 18-20.
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tive than the FTCA remedy.17 The Court indicated that these circumstances supported its conclusion that Congress did not intend to oust
direct action under the Constitution. 10 8
Resistance in Carlson from four members of the Court was strong.
Justice Powell,1" 9 in concurrence with the Court's judgment only, objected to placing the "threshold burden" on the defendant. 1 10 He also
objected to the rigidity of requiring congressional intent to be "clothed"
in the Court's "prescribed linguistic garb."11' 1 Finally, he objected to the
implication in the majority's analysis that a right to sue was replacing
judicial discretion concerning whether a plaintiff could sue directly under
the Constitution.1 12 This shift, he concluded, was "inconsistent with the
Court's long-standing recognition that Congress is ultimately the appropriate body to create federal remedies." '1 13
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Carlson stated his view that the
"adequacy" of a congressional remedy, and not the intent of Congress,
was the proper test for determining whether a remedy framed directly
under the Constitution survived. 14 Justice Rehnquist's dissent conceded
'1 15
that the federal courts have the power to "fashion equitable remedies,"
however he indicated that absent congressional authorization, the Court
was powerless to create damages remedies in the face of congressional
the power
silence. Justice Rehnquist maintained that only Congress had
1 16
to establish damages remedies for constitutional violations.
In Bush v. Lucas,1 17 the latest case in the series, the Supreme Court
unanimously denied the damages action brought under the Constitution
by a federal civil service employee alleging a violation of first amendment
rights by his superior. The Court assumed that the civil service remedies
established by Congress were not intended to be, and were not in fact,
107. The Court identified four factors to support its conclusion that the FTCA was not
intended to preclude an action brought under the Constitution: (1) a Biv'ns remedy is a more
effective deterrent; (2) punitive damages may be available under Bivens; (3) under Bivens a jury
is available; and (4) Bivens liability is based on uniform federal law whereas FTCA liability is
tied to state law. Id. at 20-23.

108. Id. at 19.
109. Joined by Justice Stewart.
110. 446 U.S. at 27 (Powell, J., concurring). With the FTCA amended to include a remedy, Justice Powell could not see the wisdom of requiring the defendant to refute the plaintiff's
choice to go directly under the Constitution and ignore the statute.

111. Id.
112. Id. at 28.
113. Id. at 27.

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist made this point several times. Id. at 34, 38, 41, 44.
462 U.S. 367 (1983).
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equally effective as an individual damages remedy.11 If an equally effective congressional remedy were the only basis for denying a constitutionally rooted remedy, the plaintiff would have prevailed. However, the
Court, relying upon Bivens, recognized a second limitation to constitution-based actions. It phrased this limitation as "special factors counselling hesitation"1' 9 which arise when Congress has not spoken. The
Court then analyzed the federal civil service system, and concluded that
congressional involvement with it was so longstanding and comprehensive that the Court should defer to congressional decisionmaking in this
special context. Thus, even though "existing remedies do not provide
complete relief"120 and one must add, "do not even provide equally effective relief," the special factors compelling inaction govern.
The Court's opinion can be interpreted as meaning that special factors, when present, will prevail regardless of the inadequacy of remedies.
However, in a footnote the Court stated, "We need not reach the question whether the Constitution itself requires a judicially fashioned damages remedy in the absence of any other remedy to vindicate the
underlying right .

,12" It further added: "The existing civil service

remedies for a demotion in retaliation for protected speech are clearly
constitutionally adequate." 122 Thus, it appears possible that the Court in
the future will find "special factors" only when constitutionally minimal
damages, or perhaps other remedies, are also present.
As this summary of the role of Congress reveals, the current status
of congressional power over constitutional remedies is murky and unsettled. Congress has a role to play, but what that role is and what the
limits are remain unclear. The ideal suggested in this Article, that an
appropriate private remedy should have top priority among remedies and
should function as a due process minimum, is not reality. Consequently,
it does not presently serve as a restriction on Congress.
C. A Private Remedy Overlooked: The Exclusionary Rule
The role of the exclusionary rule123 as it relates to fourth amendment violations brings into focus the tension present in determining
118. Id. at 372-73.
119. Id. at 378 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396).
120. Id. at 388.
121. Id. at 378 n.14 (emphasis added).
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. In 1914, the Supreme Court decided Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), in
which it applied the exclusionary rule remedy to federal prosecutions to bar evidence obtained
in violation of the search and seizure safeguards of the Fourth Amendment.
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whether a remedy should be public or private.' 24 The traditional rationale for the exclusionary rule, announced in Weeks v. United States, 25 was
to preserve the integrity of the federal courts.126 The absence of any
effective private remedy against police excesses compelled the Court to
127
extend the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio.
In recent years, the question of exclusion has turned on whether or
not the rule sufficiently deters law enforcement personnel. Chief Justice
Burger has argued that the rule does not sufficiently deter, frequently
allows the guilty to go free, and provides no remedy in situations where
28
the search proves unsuccessful.
The argument that the rule does not deter has been challenged by
Justice Brennan. He argues that while the rule may lack specific deterrence value, it serves the purpose of general deterrence-deterrence of
police practices at the department level rather that at the individual of-

ficer level. 129
The significance of the debate concerning the exclusionary rule for
3°
the purposes of this Article is that until 1984 in United States v. Leon,
no member of the Court argued that exclusion was required to correct
the state's violation of an individual's constitutional right. All the values
previously discussed related only to public concerns. In his Leon dissent
in support of the exclusionary rule, however, Justice Brennan makes a
strong private rights argument.13 1 Nevertheless, if exclusion is to con124. For example, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) and Segura v. United States,
468 U.S. 796 (1984), are the current Supreme Court battlefield.
125. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
126. Weeks stressed that the Fourth Amendment applied to the courts as well as to the
police and that the courts were not free to contribute to a violation. Id. at 391-92. Actually,
Weeks was not an exclusionary rule case at all, but a return of evidence case. The Court's
primary concern was enforcing the Fourth Amendment for the benefit of the individual.
Somehow over the years, the significance of the case shifted from the individual to the court.
See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 358-60 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
128. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
129. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 556 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
"good faith" inquiry which the Supreme Court has recently partially resolved also is directed
at specific and not general deterrence. Although Justice White includes general deterrence
references in his opinion in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 (e.g., "If exclusion ... is to
have any deterrent effect... it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or
the policies of their departments"), elsewhere in his opinion he omits reference to general
deterrence (e.g., "Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations."). Id. at 921. In his
dissent, Justice Brennan argues that the majority "overlooks" the general deterrence perspective. Id. at 953 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
131. Id. at 943 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
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it will not be because priority has been granted it as a
tinue to endure,132
private remedy.
D.

A Private Remedy Unleashed-Almost

The Supreme Court's remedial approach in school desegregation illustrates a private remedy achieving and maintaining high priority status.
In its second hearing in Brown v. Board of Education,13 3 the Court began

its remedial journey ambiguously with its now famous oxymoronic
134

message that desegregation shall proceed with "all deliberate speed."
That the message was sent to a part of the nation reluctant to change
made it clear-at least in retrospect-which of the contradictory options
would be followed. 35 In addition, ambiguity also surrounded the iden-

tity of the parties deserving the remedy. Was Brown a class action
suit? 13 6

If so, did this transform the nature of the remedy from private to
37
public?1
The remedial situation languished until the Court in the late
By remaining within its redoubt of empiricism and by basing the rule solely on the
deterrence rationale, the Court has robbed the rule of legitimacy. A doctrine that is
explained as if it were an empirical proposition but for which there is only limited
empirical support is both inherently unstable and an easy mark for critics. The extent
of this Court's fidelity to Fourth Amendment requirements, however, should not
turn on such statistical uncertainties. I share the view, expressed by Justice Stewart
for the Court in Farettav. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), that "[p]ersonal liberties
are not rooted in the law of averages." Id. at 834. Rather than seeking to give effect
to the liberties secured by the Fourth Amendment through guesswork about deterrence, the Court should restore to its proper place the principle framed 70 years ago
in Weeks that an individual whose privacy has been invaded in violation of the
Fourth Amendment has a right grounded in that Amendment to prevent the government from subsequently making use of any evidence so obtained.
132. The Court has recently reiterated its position that exclusion is not a private remedy.
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 2583-84 (1986).
133. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
134. Id. at 301.
135. As one observer has phrased it, "Throughout the balance of the Fifties, the South
interpreted 'all deliberate speed' to mean 'any conceivable delay.'"
TICE 752-53 (1977).

R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUS-

136. It should be recalled that Brown was decided before the 1966 modernization of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, on class actions. In the first Brown opinion, Chief Justice
Warren called the actions "class actions." 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). It has also been said that
"[t]he school desegregation cases that led to the decision in Brown and virtually every school
suit since then have been filed as class actions." Bell, Serving Two Masters: IntegrationIdeals
and Client Interests in School DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 505 n.115 (1976).
137. Because a constitutional violation is public, it is easy to think of the remedy as public.
A class action also supports the public perspective. Both a public and private remedy would
correct the situation, e.g., an illegally constructed educational system. If the remedy is viewed
first as private, this would support desegregation in a smaller context, such as the school which
the plaintiffs attend. Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963), illustrates these contending
views.
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1960's'38 and early 1970's changed the message to require immediate action plus an effective remedy-public or private. Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education139 demonstrated a major effort by the
Court to guide both courts and school boards. Chief Justice Burger's
unanimous opinion was apparently an effort to walk the line between
granting the lower federal courts full remedial authority and limiting the
exercise of the courts' broad equity powers. Although a compromise
opinion, Swann reads more easily as an expansive grant of authority to
the courts. So long as the lower courts were redressing a wrong,"t4 they

were given the full array of equitable tools. No particular remedy or
mixture was mandated but all were authorized.
Aside from a few detours, 14 1 the Court has maintained its position
even though some remedial schemes have been so intrusive 4 2 that in
other contexts they would have been stricken as violative of the Court's
concern with a balanced federalism. The Court has continued to be
steadfast, despite strong political pressure directed at stopping busing:
congressional prohibition of the administrative use of busing 14 3 and congressional bills to deny the federal courts authority to use the remedy."4
The Court's remedial position has also weathered both the empirical
studies suggesting that blacks do as well or better educationally in separate school settings,' 4 5 and the criticism that the courts should stress ed138. See Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
139. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
140. The idea of "wrong" seemed to be the Supreme Court's control mechanism over lower
courts. The lower courts were not to frame a remedy until a wrong had been found and the
scope and duration of the remedy had been limited by the wrong.
141. See, e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (the Court
ordered the district court to relinquish jurisdiction over one function of the school district even
though the district as a whole was not in full compliance); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717
(1974) (interdistrict remedy invalidated even though, arguably, the wrong was properly being
corrected by the remedy).
142. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 293 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (the State of Michigan was ordered to pay about $5,800,000 to the Detroit School
Board).
143. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000C-2006a (1982), passed in 1972, prohibits the use of federal funds to
aid in any program for busing to desegregate.
144. For a discussion of the Nixon proposals to Congress, see R. BORK, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUSING PROPOSALS (1972). For a list of bills in the 1981, 97th
Congress, see Sager, supra note 87, at 18 n.3.
145. A review of research findings through September, 1977, discovered a mixed bag. "It
has taken us a long time to realize what probably should have been obvious in the first placethat moving children around like checkers will not in itself improve matters.... To date,
because social scientists have studied the effect on children of 'mere desegregation,' their findings appear inconclusive." St. John, The Effects of School Desegregationon Children: A New
Look at the Research Evidence, in RACE AND SCHOOLING IN THE CITY 84, 98-99 (1981).
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46

ucational quality and not desegregation.'
The reason that the private remedy has remained so durable in
school desegregation cases may be due to the unique nature of racial segregation. Given the Brown Court's recognition that a civil war had been
fought over racial issues, that the Constitution had been amended to correct that problem, and that constitutional equality did not mean comparability-as if the issue were one of mathematics-but sameness, it is
understandable that the Court would persevere in its efforts ta achieve its
goal and not let the variety of public values stand in its way. The priority

given to private remedies in school desegregation cases shows its
feasibility.
One might argue, however, that the dispute among Justices of the
Supreme Court regarding remedies in public law litigation concerns the
intrusiveness of the public remedy and the illegitimacy and incompetence
of federal courts to fashion it-and that there is no dispute over whether
a private remedy should be given. This oversimplifies the situation for
several reasons: First, private remedies can be very intrusive; 14 7 second,
policies against the expansive public remedy can be stretched and applied
to the point that not only the public but the private remedy as well is
emasculated; 148 and third, similar to the second, policies against the public remedy may adversely affect the private remedy by being used to narrow wrongs, 14 9 tighten procedures, 150 and redefine rights,15' Thus, that
the private remedy remains not only alive but vigorous in school desegre146. See Bell, supra note 136, at 515-16. Columnist William Raspberry in his newspaper
columns and Professor Thomas Sowell in his books and articles also make the argument. The
"quality" of formal education is a policy, however, that is arguably irrelevant to the remedial
goal of "equality" of persons.
147. An injunction on behalf of one individual, issued by a federal court against a state
official ordering that official to cease a particular practice vis-a-vis the individual, is as intrusive
as an order to stop the practice, period. It also can be more offensive because it may appear
less objective and impartial than an across-the-board prohibition.
148. Because the remedies for a public remedy and a private remedy are the same, a policy
based on public values that negates the public remedy may automatically negate the private
remedy unless a conscious effort is made to distinguish the public and the private remedies and
to accommodate both.
149. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), is illustrative of the point. In Milliken, the
wrong was narrowly defined so as to preclude an interdistrict remedy that would have intruded
upon the structure of local government.
150. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the Supreme Court tightened
procedures, making it more difficult for an individual trying to protect his rights to obtain an
injunction.
151. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), illustrates the point in the juvenile law context.
The pretrial detention of a juvenile was upheld after the liberty interest of the child was redefined into almost oblivion by the Court's legal premise "that juveniles... are always in some
form of custody." Id. at 260.
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gation litigation is no mean accomplishment. None of this is to say, however, that the private remedy, either alone or in conjunction with the
public remedy, has been completely successful. 52
II.

A Private Remedy Proposal: Perspective,
Priority, and Process

A. Private Remedy Perspective
The Supreme Court should promote an approach to constitutional
litigation that gives priority to private remedies. First, when an action
presents both private and public remedy options, a court should satisfy
the private remedial claims before the others. Second, public policies of
limitation or deference should not be applied to the private remedy.
Third, where a private remedy and a public remedy overlap, public policies of accommodation, not limitation, should be employed. While the
public remedy may lie beyond the private remedy, current public policy
concerns 153 should not affect the priority of the private remedy.
A problem arises in that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between public and private remedies. In circumstances where a private
remedy cannot be isolated, the "appropriate relief" variable would simply be added to the cauldron of public policies. However, a private remedy in any given case should not be readily surrendered.
Assuming for the moment the priority of the private remedy, an
analysis from a private remedy perspective of two recurring remedial
problems-the exclusionary rule and the injunction-can be instructive.
1. Exclusionary Rule
When a fourth amendment violation has occurred, a significant
wrong has taken place. Given that a right of great magnitude has been
violated, a remedy of comparable magnitude should be available. Furthermore, because the violation infringes upon an identifiable private interest, the available remedy should be private.
A complete remedy generally places the individual in the position in
which he would have been had the violation not occurred. However, in
the fourth amendment context, such a remedy is often not sensible. Returning to the victim of an illegal search and seizure the dead body, the
152. Impressions are suspect, and empirical data are difficult to obtain and become outdated quickly. For a fairly recent and optimistic account of busing in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg North Carolina school district, see Daniels, In Defense of Busing, N.Y. Times, April 17,
1983, at 34.
153. A "loophole" or "safety valve" use of public policy in conjunction with the private
remedy must be conceded. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
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kilo of drugs, or the cache of hand grenades, in most circumstances
would hardly be acceptable."5 4 In some instances, however, a return of
the seized items would present no problems and could be accomplished
under current federal procedures. 5
To the extent that return of the seized items is not feasible, the evidence should be completely excluded from official channels. Not only
would this entail exclusion at trial but, contrary to current practices, exclusion from any official use. For example, it would mean exclusion from
serving as a basis for questioning before a grand jury, 156 pressuring forth
a guilty plea,' 5 7 cross-examining a defendant, 5 8 or using as a lead to
locate a witness.'

59

Although return and exclusion both seek to redress constitutional
violations, they are ultimately imperfect remedies. They lack any value
when the illegal search turns up nothing to seize;160 and they are incomplete remedies because they do not address the intangible and more abstract yet real injuries that often manifest themselves as a result of an
illegal search and seizure.1 61 In many instances, money compensation
will still be necessary to compensate a plaintiff for intangible injuries.
Furthermore, when the police repeat the same illegal conduct, or the risk
154. While this is generally true, there are instances when the return might be appropriate.
For example, suppose the body is seized from a mortuary, the drugs from a research scientist,
or the grenades from a licensed manufacturer.
155. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) distinguishes exclusion from return. It provides in part: "A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district
court ... for the return of the property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful possession of
the property .... If the motion is granted the property shall be restored ....
FED. R. CRIM.
P. 41(e). Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(f) and 12 govern motions to suppress
evidence.
156. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (permitted witness to be questioned
about evidence unconstitutionally seized).
157. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (coerced confession which may have
motivated plea was not enough to get plea set aside). The Court has held that the invalidity of
a confession or a search is not grounds for upsetting a guilty plea because "the conviction does
not rest in any way on evidence that may have been improperly seized." Haring v. Prosise, 462
U.S. 306, 321 (1983). The plea process, especially with the assistance of counsel, is viewed as a
distinct process free from the pressures of prior events. Id. However, the conclusion that the
illegal evidence does not influence the guilty plea is a legal conclusion and not necessarily a
factual one.
158. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (permitted questioning the defendant
regarding unlawfully seized evidence solely for the purpose of attacking the defendant's
credibility).
159. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (permitted, but qualified).
160. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. at 411 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
161. These include mental distress, embarrassment, humiliation, physical inconvenience
and discomfort, and last but not least, injury to the right of privacy itself.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 14:77

of repetition is high, injunctive relief may also be necessary to fully compensate the wronged party.
The public interests that support exclusion, such as judicial purity
and police deterrence, hold no relevance when framing the private remedy. However, as previously mentioned, there will be instances where
the public interest is so compelling that a compromise between the public
and private remedies must be sought.162 Therefore, a public interest escape valve must be built into the private remedial scheme. Although the
safety valve may reduce the scope of the private remedy, its main function should be as a mechanism to allow adjustments among private

remedies. 163
2. Injunction
For a federal injunction against state or local officials to prevail, it
1 66
16 5
must satisfy the requirements of equity,'" abstention, and ripeness.
In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 167 the Supreme Court has added another
168
hurdle: standing with a comity twist.
In Lyons, the plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the Los Angeles police department from making further use of the "chokehold," a
dangerous physical restraint.1 69 The Supreme Court permitted the plain162. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 154.
163. "Safety valve" means simply that certain public values must be considered relevant to
the private remedy to keep it from being applied improperly. At the same time, these public
values should not be used as a pretext to preclude the private remedy, but only as an aid to
finding a workable private remedy alternative.
164. It is unclear why equity requirements, especially irreparable injury, derived from an
outdated English procedure, should automatically be applied to twentieth century constitutional litigation in the United States. Equity may be a convenient source for doctrines that the
Court could use to fashion a remedy under the related notion of comity. If this is true, then
"irreparable injury" ought not be a requirement for an injunction against federal officers where
comity does not apply; and it ought not be a requirement for a "statutory injunction" unless
the Court finds that Congress intended comity factors to enter into the Court's selection of a
remedy.
165. See supra note 13.
166. See supra note 15.
167. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
168. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. When an injunction is sought against a
state official after a state judicial action has begun, comity precludes a federal court from
issuing it-unless "great and immediate" irreparable injury is shown. See Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971).
169. Four Los Angeles police officers stopped the plaintiff for having a burned-out taillight.
Without apparent reason one of the officers applied a chokehold which caused the plaintiff to
blackout. Upon regaining consciousness he was ticketed and allowed to go. The plaintiff contended that the Los Angeles Police Department had a policy of allowing the chokehold even in
routine cases and that it had caused serious injury and death in numerous instances.

Fall 1986]

PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL WRONGS

103

tiff to pursue a claim in damages, but denied injunctive relief. 7 ' The
injunction sought by the plaintiff asked the court to bar the practice completely as a per se unconstitutional technique; 7 ' however, the plaintiff
also framed the request for relief in a private context.172
Despite countervailing policy considerations, a number of moderate
injunction options were available to the Court. 7 3 For example, the
Court might have fashioned a remedy that would have prohibited the
"chokehold" in situations involving routine, minor traffic offenses. 74 In
any event, the Court in fashioning an injunction should consider factors
relevant to both the plaintiff and the particular situation occasioning the
75
cause of action.'
In Lyons it was not possible to customize the injunction into a private remedy, detached from public considerations. Although some spillover into the public realm was not unexpected, this should not serve to
foreclose the injunction altogether. The Court in Lyons could have fashioned a remedy that would have served both the public and private interests involved. For example, a prohibition against the chokehold in
routine traffic stops would have guaranteed the plaintiff freedom from
possible recurring episodes, while ensuring an accommodation with
countervailing public values by producing a narrow but meaningful re-

striction on public authorities.
An alternative approach, which would also preserve the private
remedy and protect public values, is to have the parties cooperate in pro170. The denial was based on a lack of standing: the plaintiff could not show that he would
be subjected to the chokehold in the future-the possibility was too speculative.
171. The plaintiff also sought declaratory relief on this ground,
172. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 98.
173. Public policy considerations against the use of the injunction seem to be rooted in
federalism concerns-whether phrased as no standing, no irreparable injury, a hesitancy to
order state officials to refrain from acting, fear that federal court orders will go unenforced,
confidence in state institutions, especially the courts, to monitor state agents, or reluctance to
interfere in state proceedings once underway.
174. Because a traffic offense can be committed without any awareness by the offender, and
because the use of the chokehold is unpredictable in the hands of the stopping police officer, a
private remedy that addresses the future worries and fears of the plaintiff ought to be available.
The Court, in the past, has not been sympathetic to claims challenging governmental
responses that the Court deems uncertain and unclear, even though the plaintiff is "chilled" in
the exercise of his rights. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (chill based on uncertain
future use of army surveillance records; relief denied). However, the Court should distinguish
cases in which the "chill" is combined with a potentially lethal governmental response.
175. The significance or minor character of a crime is sometimes relevant in determining
the propriety of a police response. The Court recently has used this factor in deciding that a
drunkeness offense was not serious enough to allow police to make an "exigency" entry into a
dwelling without a warrant to arrest a suspect. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984). See
also supra note 174.
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ducing an acceptable consensual solution upon reaching the remedial
stage in the litigation. However, the court would need to monitor the
76
negotiations to assure that the private remedy will not be sacrificed.1

Because neither the private remedy of exclusion nor the private injunction works in a vacuum, they cannot be sustained by reference to
exclusively private remedial concepts. Public policies always hover
nearby and serve both to soften the private remedy 17 7 and to support
extension of the private remedy into the public arena. 171 In both situations, however, it is the private perspective and the private remedy that
should remain paramount.
Although one might insist that the Constitution mandates an effective judicial remedy for violations of individual rights, that is not the
rigid position of this Article. It is preferable that the Supreme Court
develop flexible constitutional remedial principles of "appropriate relief."
The reason for not reading remedy into right 179 is that the pairing tends
to become formalistic and the remedy automatic. Thus, as discussed
above, a safety valve policy of limitation must in some instances come

into play.18 o
In addition to the accommodation policies previously discussed, an
accommodation of competing private interests must also be considered.18 Affirmative action solutions often present the dilemma of the
private remedy of one interest adversely affecting the private rights of
another. 8 2 Similarly, other concerns may have to be accepted as an ac176. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in PublicLaw Litigation, 80 HARV L. REy. 1281,
1298-1301 (1976); see also Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986). The
Court rejected a remedy proposed by the offending party, pointing out that "the task of fashioning a proper remedy is one that should be performed by the District Court after all interested parties have had an opportunity to be heard." Id. at 1077 n.22. In that case, the Court
added, "The judicial remedy for a proven violation of law will often include commands that
the law does not impose on the community at large." Id.
177. For example, as with the exclusionary rule.
178. For example, as with the injunction.
179. Actually the remedy should be tied to the wrong, with the right serving as a mere
trigger. Even with this clarification, however, the wrong/remedy idea can become formal,
leading to a result in which the remedy is considered a perfect fit and thus the maximum
quantum of relief. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 710-15
(1978), elaborates this point.
180. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
181. These cases sometimes are difficult because all of the clashing private interests have a
preferred constitutional status. See, e.g., United Jewish Organization v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977) (religion versus racial minority); Pittsburgh Press v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413
U.S. 376 (1973) (free press versus women's rights).
182. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Bakke was a
contest between a minority applicant and Mr. Bakke. a white applicant. Unless the Davis
Medical School enlarged its entering class by one, somebody was left out. Whatever happened
to the person Bakke displaced?
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cooperacommodation. For example, where a remedy requires18nonparty
3
tion, public recalcitrance may have to be considered.
This Article takes the position that a presumption should operate
against all safety valve and accommodation factors.' 84 Such a presumption would exclude from the remedies analysis policies such as administrative convenience, judicial restraint, separation of powers, and
comity.

18 5

B. The Role of the Court
In order for the private remedy priority to be implemented, the
track leading to specific private relief must not be cluttered with public
obstacles. These obstacles are now promoted by the Court's approach to
traditional remedies, immunities, and the role of Congress. 186 In each
category, the Court needs to modify current doctrines to ensure a priority for the private remedy.
1.

TraditionalRemedies

The Court should permit claimants to litigate an alleged constitutional wrong without being forced to specify a remedy at the outset. This
suggestion is in keeping with both the common law'8 7 and Federal Rule
54,188 as neither approach considers the remedy critical to the validity of
the pleadings.
If this approach were adopted, several consequences would follow.
First, the Court would have to relinquish its practice of using remedies as
a means of pretermitting the issue of wrong. Further, it would force
abandonment of procedural doctrines such as abstention and irreparable
injury that are inextricably tied to specific remedies. 8 9 Similarly, the
connection between standing and injunction created by the Court in Ly183. See Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983). Whether one takes
an "interest balancing" or "rights maximizing" approach, the author argues, public recalcitrance cannot be ignored, and, at times, must be weighed as a practical factor in determining
the most effective remedy. Id. at 608-09.
184. What this translates into is that initially as complete a private remedy as possible
should be posited. Then, movements away from this because of policies of accommodation or
necessity may be raised by the other party or the court. For the presumption to be maintained,
however, a conservative approach to the selection and the use of public policies is required.
185. A potential problem that arises from this approach is that it may lead to the result
where the private remedy becomes the maximum allowed, thus precluding the public remedy
altogether.
186. See supra notes 50-122 and accompanying text.
187. See E. BORCHARD, supra note 70, at 162.
188. See FI'D. R. Civ. P. 54(c).

189. Both are current limitations on the federal injunction. Set. supra notes 13, 56 and
accompanying text.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 14:77

ons would have to be cut.19 ° Second, declaratory judgments, as Congress
intended, could be treated as real judgments.19 1 Third, the questions regarding the priority of traditional remedies would be eliminated. 192
2. Immunities
The immunity doctrines of the Supreme Court serve primarily as
restrictions on the remedy of damages. The current doctrine protects
both government and its employees from damage actions. Whether
viewed under existing law, where the plaintiff may allege damages as a
desired remedy, or under the suggested approach, in which the plaintiff
would seek simply appropriate relief, the current across the board immuity structure effectively eliminates damages as a constitutional remedial
alternative.
Aside from the Eleventh Amendment, the several immunity defenses are Supreme Court created and could be abolished or limited as
the Court did in Nevada v. Hall,19 3 and more recently in Pulliam v. Allen. 194 However, a policy determination by the Supreme Court leading
to abolishment of common-law sovereign immunity would not serve to
eliminate the restriction of the Eleventh Amendment.1 95 Because most
constitutional violations committed by states violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, and because that Amendment was passed with the purpose
of restricting states in their unconstitutional actions, it is a sound conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment does not restrict causes of action
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has
supported this view where Congress, pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, has made it clear that it wants that result.196 Fur190. See supra notes 167-172 and accompanying text.
191. "Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and
shall be reviewable as such." 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
192. When a constitutional injury has occurred, the relief should depend on what is an
effective private remedy-be it damages, injunction, declaratory judgment, restitution, mandamus, the appointment of a special monitor, a creative remedy to fit the occasion, or some mix.
193. 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (federal law does not mandate that a state's sovereign immunity
be recognized by the courts of another state).
194. 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (neither absolute nor conditional immunity protects judge from
prospective injunction or award of attorney fees).
195. The Eleventh Amendment is phrased as a power restriction on the federal courts'
jurisdiction to hear certain cases in which a state is a party defendant. It has been construed
by the Supreme Court, however, to be only a sovereign immunity restriction. The effect is to
constitutionalize the common law immunity. See J.NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49-55 (3d ed. 1986).

196. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). In this case, the Court held that a
damage action in federal court against a state, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, did not violate the Eleventh Amendment. "T]he Eleventh Amendment ...[is] necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 456.
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thermore, commentators have argued-and it is now accepted by four
members of the Supreme Court-that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to preclude actions against states in federal court only in diversity
situations, and not in actions based on federal questions.1 7
The Supreme Court thus should remove common law immunities
from public officials and from the federal government, and it should limit
the scope of the eleventh amendment protection of state government.
The goal should be to place the ultimate financial burden on government ' 98 except in rare instances, for example, where the public official is
acting clearly beyond his office or in deliberate violation of another person's rights. Sovereign immunity, in addition to being a misnomer, 19 9 is
not a concept whose validity is self-evident. Why should the representatives or agents of the sovereign have a defense when sued by a member of
the sovereign? Of course, whenever government is required to pay damages it uses the sovereign's resources. The question then becomes: Did
the people intend to prevent a person from recovering financial reimbursement from them for the constitutional excesses committed by their
agent? Historically, even under a regime where a king was sovereign,
evidence suggests that the sovereign was not immune from damages actions. °° Sovereign immunity should be abolished so that courts can use
damages where necessary to provide an appropriate private remedy.
3. Role of Congress
If the courts are to have the responsibility of fashioning "appropriate relief" for private constitutional injuries, then it is important that
Congress not be allowed to limit available remedial options. Thus, the
197. See Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1967);
see also the dissent of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens in Green v. Mansour, 106 S. Ct. at 429-32.
198. See P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 184 (1983) ("The remedial system of the future
should look to an expanded governmental liability for damages as its first and basic line of
defense against public torts.").
199. In this country the people are sovereign, not their governments or the persons who
make the governments function. The uniqueness and importance of this concept is discussed
in G. WOOD, supra note 34, at 593-615.
200. That well-known phrase "the king can do no wrong" has at least two meanings: (1)
the king is above the law and cannot be held to wrongdoing by traditional legal norms; and (2)
the king is the perfect embodiment of the law. To the extent that he should on occasion fall
below the standard, a remedy will be given to bring the king back to perfection. The "petition
of right" procedure for suing the king reflects both positions-that traditional procedures will
not suffice and that ultimately the sovereign will pay for his illegalities-even though his consent, whether actual or fictional, must be obtained. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. Ri'V. 1, 1-5 (1963): P. SCHUCK, supra note 198, at
30-32.
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position stated by Justice Powell that "Congress is ultimately the appropriate body to create federal remedies,"2 0 1 however valid when applied to
a Court-Congress dispute over remedies for the protection of nonconstitutional federal rights, and even when applied to public remedies for protecting constitutional rights, ought not be applicable to private remedies
for constitutional violations. The Supreme Court has not decided any
cases that would clearly preclude the adoption of the proposal made in
this Article-that constitutional private remedies be protected from Congress' powers to dilute. However, the Court has shown a deference to the
legislature that might be considered preclusive. For example, in Bivens
the Court acknowledged that Congress had neither "explicit[ly]" denied
a damages remedy nor created an "equally effective" 20 2 alternative remedy. In Carlson,20 3 the Court stressed the intent of Congress in creating
a "substitute" remedy.2 " Further, in 1983, in Bush n Lucas,215 the
Court actually denied a damages action brought under the Constitution
because "special factors counsel[ed] hesitation."2 6
All three cases, Bivens, Carlson, and Bush, show support of a strong
congressional role. In Bush, however, the Court left the door open for a
possible judicial check on Congress. In a footnote the Court noted, "We
need not reach the question whether the Constitution itself requires a
judicially fashioned damages remedy in the absence of any other remedy
to vindicate the underlying right ....9207 The Court, however, finally
decided that the congressional civil service remedies were "clearly constitutionally adequate."2 8
The Court needs to rethink the role of Congress concerning private
remedies for constitutional wrongs. Ideally, the Court should protect
remedies from congressional restrictions-whether they take the form of
jurisdictional, substantive right, or remedy limitation. For example, if
the Court held that an individual whose constitutional right has been
violated is constitutionally entitled to appropriate relief, congressional
options would be automatically limited. At the same time, the dichotomy between private and public would make it clear that in the area of
public remedies for constitutional wrongs, Congress' role would probably
201. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 27 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
202. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
Id. at 18.
462 U.S. 367 (1983).
Id. at 378.
Id. at 378 n.14.

208. Id.

Fall 1986]

PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL WRONGS

109

preempt the courts20 9 whereas the Court may preempt Congress to some
degree in the private remedial context.
The suggested limitation on Congress is only directed to its power to
reduce private remedies below a due process minimum of appropriate
relief. It is conceivable, therefore, that Congress could legislate appropriate relief in such a way that the Supreme Court would defer to congressional judgment in establishing an orderly remedial package. Also,
nothing would preclude Congress from enhancing remedial options by
making available to courts remedies not traditionally created or administered by courts. Of course, any remedial scheme2 10 created by Congress
could be rescinded by Congress, but the courts' residual constitutionally
based power to utilize judicial remedies to achieve the minimum goal
would remain.
C. The Advantages of the Private Remedy Priority
The proposal suggested by this Article has three primary advantages. First, a remedies perspective focusing on private remedies gives
the injured person his or her due compensation. From the individual's
perspective, it makes sense to provide an effective judicial remedy to correct the constitutional wrong done by the state. This merely comports
with the individual's probable and reasonable expectations. Private redress also encourages the notion that the legal system is fair and just. It
reminds all of us that no person is so insignificant that his or her constitutional rights may be ignored by the governments of the United
States.21
The second advantage to the proposal is that it will make the discretionary remedial decisions of trial courts more manageable than when
209. If the public remedy, like the private, were found to be based on the Constitution, this
would serve to limit Congress.
210. For example, an elaborate administrative-judicial system of remedies.
211. See, e.g., Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960). The holding of Thompson,
that due process is violated where a criminal conviction is had without any evidence of guilt, is
hardly remarkable. However, certain other aspects of the case are worth recalling. The defendant was convicted in the police court in Louisville, Kentucky, of loitering by solo dancing
a slow shuffle in a local cafe, and he was fined $10. Because fines of less than $20 were not
reviewable in any Kentucky court, he appealed directly to the only court open to him, the
United States Supreme Court. The Justices not only listened to his story but unanimously
reversed his conviction. Although the case is unusual-generally a person who claims that he
or she was injured by an unconstitutional governmental decision and who believes that he or
she will take the case "all the way to the Supreme Court," is not being realistic- such beliefs
are valuable as a symbol of faith. Furthermore, reality may not be that far removed because
the chances are fair that some appellate court will hear the complaint and consider the constitutional challenge.
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judges are faced with what has been called the "non-legal polycentric" 2 12
variables which are so often present in public institution-type remedial
situations. Although a request for "appropriate relief" enlarges the
judge's remedial choices as compared to a request for a specific remedy,
it reduces discretion by focusing on the private remedy and omitting public remedies and their affirmative and negative public policies.21 3
Related to the second advantage is a third. If a private remedy is
given, public remedies in that case or in future cases may be unnecessary.
The logic is similar to the Supreme Court's stance in allowing declaratory judgments more readily than injunctions. If the former is effective,
the latter, a more intrusive remedy, may never be needed. The private
remedy solution, if successful, sidesteps the criticisms that courts lack
both competence and legitimacy to issue wide ranging public remedies.

Conclusion
This Article has tried to isolate and highlight the private interest in
constitutional litigation. It has argued that for constitutional wrongs,
private injuries should be repaired before public remedies and their attendant difficulties are faced. It has been suggested that a private remedy
perspective be adopted, a priority principle be established, and a due process minimum standard be devised. To accomplish these goals, this Article has suggested that: (1) pleading requirements be relaxed to an
allegation of simple "appropriate relief;" (2) there be no priority among
traditional remedies; (3) Congress' remedial role be reidentified and redefined so that it not be permitted to reduce the range of available remedial
options needed by courts; and (4) government "sovereign" immunity be
abolished.
The advantages of these changes include justice to the individual,
control over judicial remedial discretion, and the possibility of avoiding
or minimizing the use of the public remedy.

212. See Fletcher, The DiscretionaryConstitution:InstitutionalRemedies and JudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 645-49 (1982).

213. With public policies made irrelevant to the private remedy, the Supreme Court may be
more inclined to use them in the process of creating rights. Logically this is where they belong.
Also, public visibility would be improved. Thus the criminal law debate on the exclusionary
rule ought not be on the excessiveness of the remedy but on the excessiveness of the right.

